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Abstract. Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) proposed at WPES
2005 the first scheme that considers real-world threats and that is more
realistic for remote elections. Their scheme, though, has quadratic work
factor and thereby is not efficient for large scale elections. Based on the
work of JCJ, Smith proposed an efficient scheme that has linear work
factor. In this paper we first show that the Smith’s scheme is insecure.
Then we present a new coercion-resistant election scheme with linear
work factor that overcomes this and other flaws of the Smith’s proposal.
Our solution is based on the group signature scheme of Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya (Crypto 2004).
1 Introduction
Remote electronic elections may provide many benefits to democratic societies.
It may increase elections turnouts, afford convenience to the voters, and reduce
costs, for instance. The risks inherent in such elections, though, can discourage its
use in real world. The main threat is that coercion and vote-selling can be easily
explored by adversaries. Remote elections, thus, must have ways to mitigate such
problems.
Most existing proposals for remote elections rely on the receipt-freeness re-
quirement and on assumptions to deal with coercion and vote-selling. Preventing
receipts to be made, though, is not enough to counter these problems as the voter
can be observed while voting, for example. The assumptions claimed (e.g. the
voter cannot give away her private key material), in addition, are not realistic
for remote scenarios.
Recently, Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) [6] introduced a more com-
plete requirement for remote elections called coercion-resistance. This concept
considers not only the receipt-freeness requirement, but also real world attacks
related to coercion (and vote-selling). Coercion-resistance takes into account that
an adversary can force the voter to abstain from voting, can obtain private in-
formation from the voter and vote on his behalf, or can force the voter to send
a randomly formed ballot as her vote.
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In order to fulfill this new requirement, JCJ introduced the first coercion-
resistant election scheme. The scheme basically mitigates coercive attacks by
allowing the voter to deceive the adversary about her true vote intention and to
vote again afterwards. It, though, cannot be used in large elections as it requires
quadratic work factor (in number of votes) to compute the voting results. Par-
ticularly, the scheme relies on an inefficient comparison mechanism to determine
the results.
Based on JCJ solution, Smith [7] proposed an improved coercion-resistant
scheme. The scheme replaces the inefficient comparison mechanism of JCJ by
a new one that computes the voting results in linear time. Weber et al. [8],
however, pointed out weaknesses on Smith’s proposal and fixed them through of
a new scheme.
In this work we first present a weakness of Smith’s mechanism of comparison
that makes it insecure. The problem is also relevant to the scheme of Weber et
al. as it employs the ideas of Smith. We then introduce a new coercion-resistant
scheme. Our solution is based on JCJ idea, but it has linear work factor and
does not rely on comparisons to compute the voting results.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we give an overview of JCJ
scheme and recall the comparison mechanism of Smith; also, we present the
weakness of Smith’s solution. In Section 3, we describe our proposal of coercion-
resistant scheme. Finally, we conclude our work in Section 4.
2 The coercion-resistant scheme of JCJ and the
comparison mechanism of Smith
2.1 The scheme of JCJ
The proposal of Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson [6] relies essentially on a mech-
anism of authentication through anonymous credentials to overcome coercive
attacks. Specially, the voter receives a valid credential (e.g. an alphanumeric
string) in a secure way and uses it when she want to cast her valid vote. A voter
over coercion, though, is able to make fake credentials and use them to cast
fake votes. An adversary has no way to distinguish between a valid and a fake
credential in the tallying phase.
The scheme considers a registration phase free of adversaries and a bulletin
board communication model. Also, it employs non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs, a probabilistic threshold public-key cryptosystem, and universal verifi-
able mix nets as cryptographic tools. In particular, the solution uses the plaintext
equivalence test [5] as comparison mechanism. This mechanism takes two cipher-
texts as input and returns a bit indicating if the corresponding plaintexts are
equal or not. The scheme is briefly described as follows:
In the registration phase, a trustworthy authority issues a unique valid cre-
dential for the voter and publishes a probabilistic encryption of this credential
on the bulletin board. The encryptions published on the bulletin board forms the
list L1. During the voting phase, the voter sends to the bulletin board (through
an anonymous channel) a triple containing her encrypted vote, her encrypted
credential, and proofs that the vote is for a valid candidate and that the voter
knows the vote and the credential encrypted.
At the end of the election day, the talliers verify all proofs posted and exclude
triples with invalid proofs. They then apply the plaintext equivalence test to the
remaining encrypted credentials to remove duplicated votes. After removing the
duplicates keeping the last posted votes, the remaining pairs of encryptions (vote
and credential) forms the list L2 and this list is sent to a mix net. The mix net
returns L2′. Then, the list L1 is sent to a different mix net that returns L1′.
Now, the plaintext equivalence test is used a second time to compare the list
L1′ with the list L2′. A vote is removed if its encrypted credential in L2′ does
not match with an element of L1′. Finally, the votes with valid credentials are
decrypted by the talliers.
Although the JCJ scheme fulfills the coercion-resistance requirement, the
comparisons involving the plaintext equivalence tests makes it inefficient for
large scale elections. Let N be the number of voters and V be the number of
posted votes, one has V ≥ N and the overhead to perform the tests is quadratic
in V .
2.2 The Smith’s comparison mechanism
Based on the JCJ proposal, Smith [7] introduced a more efficient coercion-
resistant scheme. The solution substitutes the previous comparison mechanism
of JCJ for a new one that computes the voting results in linear time. In addition,
it includes an additional mix step in the tallying phase and uses timestamps. The
later improvements, though, are not relevant as pointed out by Weber et al. [8].
The mechanism of Smith performs a global blind comparison of cipher-
texts instead of employing the costly plaintext equivalence test. In order to do
this, the method makes deterministic fingerprints from probabilistic encryptions.
This way, the fingerprints can be compared through hash tables efficiently. The
method is shortly described as follows:
Let k be an ElGamal private key shared among the talliers and corresponding
to a public key published on a bulletin board, E[σ] an ElGamal ciphertext of
a credential σ that is made with talliers’ public key, and j a secret key shared
by the talliers that is used jointly with the product kj (also shared) to make
the fingerprints. The talliers cooperatively computes E[σj ] from E[σ] by using
the ElGamal malleability and obtains σj after the decryption process. For the
comparison, the talliers uses half of the bits of σj .
The Smith’s comparison method is efficient. However, we noted 1 that it is
not secure: an adversary can use the ElGamal malleability to determine whether
a coerced voter gave him a valid or a fake credential. In order to show this, we
consider the following scenario:
Suppose an adversary forces the voter to reveal her credential σ and publishes
two votes (E[C], E[σ], P ) and (E[C], E[σ2], P ′) on the bulletin board, where
1 This problem was also observed by Michael Clarkson et al. [3].
E[C] are encryptions of the same candidate C and P, P ′ are the respective
proofs. After publishing the mix net output and applying the Smith’s method to
obtain σj and σ2j (this is similar to the last steps of the JCJ tallying phase), the
adversary is able to recover the two votes by testing if one fingerprint is square
of another. Thus, if the two votes were removed by the talliers, the coercer learns
that σ is an invalid credential.
3 Our coercion-resistant scheme
As we presented in the last Section, the scheme of JCJ is inefficient for large scale
elections. Also, we showed that the comparison mechanism of Smith is insecure.
We now introduce a new coercion-resistant voting scheme that employs some of
the JCJ ideas and that computes election results in linear time.
Our solution does not rely on comparisons to identify valid credentials. In-
stead, we employ a particular mathematical structure to make the credentials
and use a function to identify them apart. The structure makes hard for a co-
ercer or a dishonest voter to forge new valid credentials, even after having seen
several valid ones.
The new scheme has the following advantages: its security can be proved, it
is a practical linear scheme (in the number of votes posted by the voters), one
cannot link the votes of a given voter in different elections, and the construction
of the credentials and the verification of their validity can be shared among sev-
eral authorities. Thus, a single corrupted authority cannot give valid credentials
to an attacker or tell to a coercer whether a credential is valid or not.
The credentials we employ are based on the group signature scheme of Ca-
menish et al. [2] (but without bilinear maps). A credential is composed of two
parts: a short one r which must be kept secret, and a long one (a, b, c). The first
part of the credential (i.e. r) has around twenty ascii characters (this corresponds
to 160 bits, the actual secure size for the order of generic groups), so a small
piece of paper and a pen are sufficient to write r down. The other part can be
stored in a device or be even sent by email to the voter without compromising
the credential security.
The cryptographic tools required to realize the new scheme are: non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs, a probabilistic threshold public-key cryptosystem, and a
universal verifiable mix net. In addition, the scheme assumes a bulletin board
communication model. We describe our proposal as follows:
In a setup phase, the keys of the authorities as well as the elections parameters
are generated. Specially, let G be a cyclic group with prime order p and E be an
ElGamal encryption algorithm with a public key (g, h) and a secret key (s) shared
among the authorities. The authorities publish their public key and a randomly
chosen value m 6= 1 on the bulletin board. We assume that the Decision Diffie-
Hellman problem is hard in G (excluding therefore groups equipped with an
efficient bilinear map).
Registration phase
In this phase, the voter obtains a unique and valid credential from the regis-
tration authorities. The authorities share the secret keys (x, y) and issue coop-
eratively to the voter her secret credential σ = (r, a, b, c), where a is a random
number in G (with a 6= 1), r is a random number in Zp, b = ay and c = ax+rxy.
In addition, the authorities furnish the voter with a proof of well-formedness for
σ. Note that if (r, a, b, c) is valid, then for all r the credential (r, al, bl, cl) is a
valid one too. This property is used by the voter to change the values a, b, c after
receiving them.
The LRSW assumption (see [2] for details) insures that even if an attacker
has many genuine credentials (ri, ai, bi, ci), it is hard for him to forge a new
and valid credential (r, a, b, c), with r 6= ri for all i. The security of our scheme
relies heavily on this assumption, which is known to hold for generic groups.
In addition, the voter cannot prove to anyone else whether (r, a, b, c) is a valid
credential or not, under the DDH assumption. This way, a voter over coercion
can make a fake r (and also make fakes a, b, c) to deceive an adversary who will
not be able to distinguish between a fake and a valid r.
Voting phase
The voter casts her vote by sending (E[C], a, E[ar], E[ax+rxy],mr, P ) through
an anonymous channel to the bulletin board, where C is the chosen candi-
date, (r, a, ar, ax+rxy) is her credential, and P is a list of non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs which insure that this vote is well-formed, in particular the r
in E[ar] and the r in mr are the same. Recall from the previous paragraph that
the values a and c = ax+rxy have been changed by the voter and are therefore
different from the ones she received from the authorities. In addition, note that
the voter does not need the part b = ay of her credential to make her vote.
The value mr is used to detect duplicates and guarantees that only one vote
will be counted per voter. Otherwise, a dishonest voter could vote several times
without being detected.
Tallying phase
In order to tally the votes, the talliers first verify the values mr to remove du-
plicates and check the proofs P . Votes with invalid proofs are excluded and only
the last posted (duplicated) votes are considered based on the order of posting
on the bulletin board. The votes that passed the verification have their values
mr and P deleted, and their second component (i.e. a) replaced by the ElGamal
ciphertext E[a] = (1, a). This way, only the values E[C], E[a], E[ar], E[ax+rxy]
are processed in the next step.
The talliers then send E[C], E[a], E[ar], E[ax+rxy] to the mix net and publish
the output on the bulletin board. Let the quadruple (t, u, v, w) = (E[C]′, E[a]′,
E[ar]′, E[ax+rxy]′) be the mix net output. For each quadruple the talliers choose
a random string α 6= 0 mod p and compute (wu−xv−xy)α. The result is equal
to 1 if and only if the credential is a valid one. Note that if the credential is
invalid, just computing wu−xv−xy may give some information to an attacker, so
the random exponent α is necessary.
Finally, the talliers cooperatively decrypt the first component of each quadru-
ple (i.e. E[C]) with valid credential and count the votes.
4 Conclusion
The scheme introduced by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) considers re-
alistic threats for remote elections and is more appropriate for such scenarios.
Unfortunately their scheme is inefficient for large scale elections and the im-
provement proposed by Smith is insecure. Aiming at overcoming the drawbacks
of these previous solutions, we have presented a new coercion-resistant scheme.
Our solution inherits some ideas from the JCJ scheme as the use of anony-
mous credentials. However, it does not rely on comparisons to identify valid
credentials. Instead, we employ a special kind of credentials and use a secure
function to identify them apart. Our credentials are based on the work of Ca-
menish et al. [2]. We have another proposal based on Boneh et al.[1] protocol,
but we leave it to a forthcoming paper.
The scheme that we have showed is efficient and secure. Although we have
not proved these properties, they will be presented in a more complete paper.
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